

22 October 1958

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# CENTRAL

# INTELLIGENCE

# BULLETIN



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25 🗶 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975A004000350001-8 II. ASIA-AFRICA 25X1 Cyprus: NATO representatives of Greece, Turkey, and Britain are continuing their meetings with Secretary General Spaak on the matter of holding an early high-level conference concerning Cyprus and appear to have reached accord on all issues except the number of neutral observers to be invited. Brussels has been accepted as the conference site. As violence on Cyprus continues, British officials estimate that EOKA is approaching its maximum potential for terrorism. Nevertheless, they predict a new truce before the end of this month. 25% 22 Oct 58 DAILY BRIEF ii

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### III. THE WEST

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Venezuela: Junta President Larrazabal, under considerable pressure within the government, is expected to resign this week in order to fulfill legal electoral requirements in running for the presidency in the election scheduled for late November. The resultant adjustment in the junta and cabinet, along with continued military suspicions of political alliances and the apparent breakdown of interparty efforts to agree upon a coalition candidate will increase the already high degree of tension in Venezuela.

Bolivia: The moderate government of President Siles

on 21 October squelched a rightist coup with only a few casualties. Rightist plotting is endemic in Bolivia. The government, which must implement stringent economic stabilization measures, will probably exaggerate the threat in order to bring closer together the clashing factions of the government

party.

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DAILY BRIEF

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### Cyprus

Final agreement on a high-level Cyprus conference of British, Greek, Turkish and Cypriot representatives is being delayed only by differences over the number of neutral observers. All concerned are agreed that NATO Secretary General Spaak and an American observer should attend; Greece alone insists that at least two other neutral nations, presumably Italy and France, be represented. Such a conference would probably be convened in November in Brussels, Spaak, to whom most of the credit is due for the progress thus far, favors a two-week meeting to establish the broad principles for agreement to be followed by lower-level technical negotiations on details.

Agreement by London, Athens, and Ankara to discuss the problem at such a conference will remove, temporarily at least, the serious strain that was developing within NATO. The major substantive problems which the talks will attempt to resolve, however, will require a maximum effort at compromise if the schisms between Greece and Turkey and between Britain and Greece are to be bridged.

On Cyprus EOKA terrorists have stepped up their campaign of violence, killing five persons, including three Turkish Cypriots, within a 48-hour period and increasing bomb attacks, shootings, arson, and sabotage. British officials on Cyprus estimate that, while EOKA may attempt one more major drive, it has about reached the limit of its potential for sustained violence. They predict a new truce, probably by the end of October, especially if agreement is reached in Paris to hold a conference. Regardless of any political settlement, however, they believe EOKA must be destroyed to remove the constant threat of renewed violence and intimidation.

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### III. THE WEST

### Impending Shake-up in the Venezuelan Government

Junta President Larrazabal's acceptance of the presidential nomination by the Democratic Republican Union (URD), probably the third party in strength, and his expected resignation this week will increase the high degree of tension in Venezuela. A majority of the cabinet reportedly have offered their resignations and have demanded that Larrazabal resign, as is required under the electoral law. Larrazabal's resignation and the resulting adjustments in the cabinet and junta, which will probably continue to be pro-Larrazabal, were apparently planned as early as mid-September to promote his candidacy.

Larrazabal's formal entry into the presidential race follows recent rumors of military plotting and probably spells the end of the political unity program which has been identified in the public mind with the return of normal government. The Christian Democratic COPEI, probably the second largest party, opposes Admiral Larrazabal as a military candidate and has nominated its chief, Rafael Caldera. Democratic Action (AD)—the largest party, toward which the military has long been hostile—has reportedly been negotiating with the URD to present Larrazabal as a joint candidate, although AD previously nominated its chief, Romulo Betancourt. The AD's ultimate endorsement of Larrazabal, who also has Communist backing, would increase the possibility of another military coup attempt in the event of Larrazabal's victory.

in the event of Larrazabal's victory.

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## Bolivian Government Says Rightist Plot Quashed

The moderate government of President Siles has announced that it put down a plot of the rightist Socialist Falange which broke out in the capital city of La Paz early on 21 October. The rest of the country was reported quiet.

At the present time the government must implement new and stringent economic stabilization measures if it is to receive new foreign credits to rectify its foreign exchange deficit. The left wing of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement, the government party, opposes some of the required measures. A definitive split in the government party would be likely to result in considerable violence since most of the army and police incline toward the right wing of the party while most civilian militia incline toward the left wing.

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Scientific Adviser to the President

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